EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Heleni Thayre
Organization : | MA Citizens for Voting Integrity
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 6.8
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Comment : | If, as the 1990 FEC standards state, and as many independent computer experts have also proven beyond any doubt 1, a one to one correspondence between the choice of the voter and the internal record of the voting machine cannot be guaranteed Then the paper record printout of the machine is NOT suitable for audits or recounts as it may not reflect the true choices of the voter. In addition, any paper record that is NOT voter verified cannot be considered an independent record suitable for providing a manual audit capacity because a) In order to audit the voting machine a record must be INDEPENDENT of the machine. Only the voter's verification provides this independence. Otherwise both records are machine records. The machine record cannot audit the machine. b) "Auditing may be defined as the process of collecting and evaluating evidence. The third standard of fieldwork requires that the auditor collect sufficient and competent evidential matter." 2 "Evidence is more reliable when obtained from an independent source. Finally, evidence obtained by the auditor through physical examination, observation, computation and inspection is more persuasive than evidence obtained indirectly." 3 Therefore, an independent, accurate and permanent paper record suitable for manual audits and recounts is required by HAVA.