EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Jordi Puiggali
Organization : | Scytl Secure Electronic Voting
Post Date : | 9/9/2005
General Comments
Comment : | (Illustration not included here.0 Figure 2: Verification process performed by a voter At the end of the election, the election authorities can retrieve, as usual, the votes from the DRE. Additionally, they can now check the votes tabulated by the DRE against an integrity record that is provided by the VM. This integrity record is generated by the VM, based on every single voter-verified vote (for the crypto savvy, the integrity record is calculated as a one-way accumulator that allows detecting any alteration of the votes with the exception of changes in the ordering of the votes). Should the set of votes retrieved from the DRE not match the integrity record from the VM, the election authorities could retrieve the back-up votes from the VM (which are the cryptographically-protected voter-verified votes) and implement a parallel recount based on them. 1. The voter makes the selection of her voting options for all the races in the DRE. 2. The selected options are transferred from the DRE to the VM. 3. The voter verifies (via screen and/or audio) the selected options and confirms them. 4. The verified voting options are encrypted and digitally signed in the VM in order to protect every single vote from possible attacks that can take place either in the DRE or outside it. 5. The protected vote is stored in the VM and a positive verification message is sent to the DRE where the vote is also stored.