EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Ron Crane
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 6.7.2.1.1
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Comment : | 5. The Guidelines (e.g., Vol. I, §6.7 ("Wireless Requirements")) permit the use of networked - and even wirelessly networked - systems. Wireless devices are unnecessary for voting systems, and introduce severe security risks, including those from malware loaders and from hacking. To its credit, Vol. I, §6.7 does note that "the use of wireless technology introduces severe risk," and does require vendors to justify its use. However, Vol. I, §6.7.2.1.1, which describes the procedure for such justification, merely requires the vendor to provide "a rationale for the inclusion of wireless", and says that "[i]n general, convenience is not a sufficiently compelling reason." No conceivable reason can justify the risks introduced by the use of wireless communications in voting systems. More basically, voting systems should not use telecommunications facilities or networks of any kind because their security risks heavily outweigh their benefits. An unscrupulous vendor could use a network connection to modify election results or to load cheats. A hacker could use it to attack the system, or the system might simply become a random victim of one of the more than 100,000 viruses and worms that inhabit cyberspace.4 Further, while elections officials may be able to maintain sufficient protection against certain external threats, they cannot effectively supervise network connections or telecommunications facilities to prevent or deter threats from unscrupulous vendors. Finally, system telecommunications are completely invisible to the public that must, in the end, be able to supervise the elections using them.