EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Stanley A. Klein
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
General Comments
Comment : | Flawed provisions allow simultaneous dual use of COTS for voting and nonvoting Another example of a clearly deficient requirement in the VVSG is its allowing COTS systems to be dually used simultaneously for voting and nonvoting activities (Volume I, Sections 2.2.5.3 and 6.5.5). Again, the proper model for a requirement is the Defense Department, that places very stringent limitations on the use of systems for both classified and unclassified processing. To switch a system between voting and nonvoting activity, a proper specification would require all persistent storage devices (such as hard drives) to be removable so votingexclusive devices would be used during votingrelated processing. There would also be a requirement that capability be provided to write numerous cycles of random data into all other memories and channels as part of the changeover between voting and non voting use of the systems. The fundamental security principle at work here is that the only way to guarantee that a capability or device can not be maliciously exploited is to physically remove it or otherwise prevent it from being present in a system. Any device or capability included in a system or connected to it in any way is capable of being surreptitiously and maliciously exploited. This especially applies to wireless, and in addition to the lack of serious testing for vulnerabilities, is a reason the provisions of Volume I Section 6.7 are fundamentally flawed.