EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | N/A
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
General Comments
Comment : | Part three of three Similarly, some voting systems are difficult to live audit efficiently, even though they may technically be live auditable. One example would be a paper-based optical scan system without unique identifiers. Live auditing the ballot scanning and interpretation component of such a system to a reasonable degree of confidence would involve the independent interpretation of a large number of ballots, and therefore make live auditing practically infeasible for this system. The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines should discourage the use of voting systems with components that are practically infeasible to live audit. Another requirement for live auditing is that the systems under audit must not have any means of detecting that they are under audit. The system must be auditable without putting it into any "test modes" or other modes of operation that are not used during a live election. Live auditing is not a new concept for election administrators. Many jurisdictions use teams of election judges, composed of citizens with different party affiliations, at various points in the voting process, including ballot box unsealing and questionable vote interpretation. In these teams, each judge is live auditing the decisions of the other judges. This basic philosophy - that decisions made by one observer must be verified by at least one other independent observer - should also be used to test the voting system equipment used during an election. The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines should promote the incorporation of peer-reviewed live audit techniques in voting system design and election official best practices.