EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Hugh Gallagher
Organization : | Election System & Management Services
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 6.7
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Comment : | So are current wireless voting systems secure? I believe the answer is “yes.” No logical or plausible scenario has been presented to show how an election can be compromised but more importantly altered using wireless voting machines. At best, if a potential attacker cannot gain access to the voting machines wireless network and “hack” the system, they can pose a security threat by jamming or flooding the wireless network with static noise that causes the wireless signals to collide and produce CRC errors. This is know as a Denial of Service Attack, and would be obvious to Election Administrators. While difficult to prevent if someone is intent on initiating a DoS, Section 6.7.6 “Protecting the Wireless Path” of the proposed standards, requires that a voting system using wireless technology be able to function properly throughout a DoS attack and function properly as if the wireless capability were never available for use. In the case of the AVS platform, and as was mentioned earlier, each machine should such an attack occur, can be opened manually by the Precinct Captain using the location card and closed manually. Each device has a removable USB memory cartridge which can be, through controlled procedures, be collected after the polls close and manually inserted into a machine and have its results aggregated. At best, a DoS attack represents a nuisance relative to standard procedures, but not a direct threat to the election. [Statements submitted at EAC public hearing, July 28, 2005, Pasadena]