EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Dan McCrea et al.
Organization : | Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 1.1
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Comment : | HAVA itself requires the Commission to broaden its vision. Section 301(b) of the Act offers an expansive definition of a voting system. That provision defines a voting system as: (1) the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used: (A) to define ballots; (B) to cast and count votes; (C) to report or display election results; and (D) to maintain and produce any audit trail information; and (2) the practices and associated documentation used-- (A) to identify system components and versions of such components; (B) to test the system during its development and maintenance; (C) to maintain records of system errors and defects; (D) to determine specific system changes to be made to a system after the initial qualification of the system; and (E) to make available any materials to the voter (such as notices, instructions, forms, or paper ballots). Section 301(b)(1) states that the system is to include “documentation required to program, control and support the equipment (B) to cast and count votes; [and] (C) to report or display election results.” Section 301(b)(2)(C) further stipulates that a voting system should include the practices and associated documentation used (C) to maintain records of system errors and defects…” These provisions certainly support broadening the objectives of the guidelines to focus on proper ballot accounting procedures and the documentation necessary to ensure that election results are trustworthy. In particular, these provisions of HAVA should force EAC to reconsider this statement in Section 1.1: The Guidelines are not intended to define appropriate election administration practices. However, the total integrity of the election process can only be ensured if the use of voting systems certified to these Guidelines is coupled with effective election administration practices. A broader focus is clearly within the ambit of Section 301(b) and this cramped reading in Section 1.1 should be discarded. At a minimum, the Guidelines must specify effective procedures to ensure proper ballot accounting. Other policy considerations support enlarging the scope of the VVSG. In particular, EAC should broaden the reach of the guidelines because they are a primary resource for local and state election officials. The failure to address the interlocking relationship between technology and administrative issues will have numerous deleterious results. First, less sophisticated jurisdictions will not appreciate the complexity of these systems if they assess DREs based on an examination of the draft VVSG. Second, many election supervisors will not understand the administrative burdens that operating a DRE system impose on their staff. Broadened guidance will be an invaluable tool for these officials. This point is supported by the National Research Council’s recent report, Asking the Right Questions about Electronic Voting [hereinafter NRC Report] In a preliminary draft issued on September 9, 2005 the NRC Report raises two critical questions about election administration and DREs: 6-16. How can election officials obtain sources of information about electronic voting systems other than the sources provided by vendors? 6-17. How can election officials obtain the knowledge and information needed to respond to and manage change effectively? NRC Report at 6-8 & 6-9. These VVSG are obviously of central importance in providing this critical guidance. Because HAVA has entrusted EAC with the duty of aiding state and local officials in administering elections, we urge EAC to listen to the views of the National Academy and rewrite the guidelines with these officials in mind.