EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Jordi Puiggali
Organization : | Scytl Secure Electronic Voting
Post Date : | 9/9/2005
Section Comments
Section : | A1D
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Comment : | [Volume I, Appendix D] The definition of direct IDV systems should include all those systems that allow voters to directly verify the correctness of their votes using a record that represents exactly their votes. This record (e.g., paper, an electronic image, an audio representation) must be generated by a device independent from the voting terminal and must be securely stored in this independent device. On the other hand, indirect IDV systems could be defined as those systems in which voters need to use an indirect method (such as a voting receipt without the exact representation of the vote) to verify that their votes have been properly recorded. Based on our proposed definition, VVPAT systems, independent module systems (described in Exhibit B), cryptographic systems without receipt and split process IDV systems would be considered direct IDV systems. On the other hand, receipt-based cryptographic systems and witness systems would be considered indirect verification systems. Therefore, we suggest to split this section in two subsections: VVPAT IDV systems and Direct Electronic IDV systems. This latter subsection would include any system that allows a direct verification with voter’s sense through an independent electronic module.