EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Cem Kaner
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 6.8
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Comment : | Stronger auditability can provide at least a few protections that are harder for a remote attacker to exploit: - Every voting system that uses electronic methods to collect votes should verify with the voter that the vote actually stored is the vote they intended. At this time, every voting system that uses electronic methods to collect votes should create a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), that is they should print a copy of the voted ballot, the voter should be required to inspect the voted ballot for accuracy, and that authenticated paper copy should be stored. Promising research is underway that might eventually free our systems of the need for paper copies. At some point, for example, we might see broadly usable products implementations of ongoing research into cryptographic methods that enable the voter to privately and security check how her or his vote was actually counted. Once systems based on methods like these become sufficiently easy to understand and use by the general public (very broadly defined to include people of all educational levels and to include people with disabilities), the Guidelines can be amended to include them as an acceptable alternative to the VVPAT. Until then, we need a requirement that reflects and implements the current state of the art.