EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | John M. Flanigan
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 6.7
Page no. : |
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Comment : | Guidelines look like they have been developed by a committee that didn't want to make the rules too tough on anyone. The Guidelines permit many methods of data transmission that are not secure or that can be made insecure quite easily and undectably. Wireless transmission, power-line transmission, There is no need for these high-tech and hacker-vulnerable techniques. The fate of the democracy rests upon the sancity of the individual vote, not on the ability to get the final count on the 11-oclock news. The dependence upon a small number of machine manufacturers would make it relatively easy for a single party to determine the outcome of an election. I am a retired professor of mathematics and computing. Anyone deeply familiar with computers will testify that it is extremely difficult to prevent fraud without careful monitoring of the manufacturers and programmers for which these guidelines do not provide. I did a study of electronic voting procedures for the local chapter of Common Cause during which I learned of the very bad reputation of electronic voting machines and their vulnerablilty to cheating. The section on Wireless (6.7) correctly mentions the dangers of tampering, but nevertheless allows it. Should not! Two absolute essentials for an honest election are 1) a voter-verifiable paper trail, and 2) the immediate determination of a spoiled ballot. No voter should leave a precinct having spoiled a ballot without having the opportunity to correct the ballot. (We have done it in Hawaii for as long as I have been precinct Voter Assistant Official.) The country should have nationwide rules for voting at least on national elections. This is not suggested by the Guidelines.