EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Ian S. Piper
Organization : | Diebold Election Systems, Inc.
Post Date : | 9/29/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 6.8.7.2
Page no. : | 51
Line no.: | 1
Comment : | In this requirement, "The voting station shall be physically secure from tampering, including intentional damage.", there is only so much protection that can be provided to a unit that is being subjected to intentional damage. If someone takes a sledge hammer to a unit or drives a truck over it, then they are likely to compromise some security feature, but, in reality, the units are secured for storage by election officials and the units are monitored during election day by poll workers. In conjunction with this scrutiny, the security features of the units can be measured for their effectiveness. One might have installed the best lock in the world, but someone with determination will find a way to break through it. A bank can be broken into if it is not kept under surveillance with responsive action taken when tampering is detected. The ideal is to provide physical security within reason and if you can't prevent tampering completely, then you must detect it. That detection is accomplished not only through audit logs and warning signals, but also by election officials monitoring and supervising the use and storage of the devices. Proposed change: Replace the requirement with the following language, "The voting station shall be physically secure from tampering, including, within reason, from intentional damage, and should tampering occur, it shall be evident.