EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Jordi Puiggali
Organization : | Scytl Secure Electronic Voting
Post Date : | 9/9/2005
Section Comments
Section : | A1D
Page no. : |
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Comment : | [Volume I, Appendix D] Comments on Section 1.2.2 End to End Cryptographic IDV Systems The general description of End to End Cryptographic IDV systems included in Appendix D is based on a specific implementation of these systems: the receipt-based systems. There are other alternative implementations that use end to end cryptography to generate a second record without issuing voting receipts. Some of these alternative implementations allow voters to verify that their votes are cast as they intended in a secure and reliable environment independent from the voting terminal. The votes are then cryptographically protected until they reach the Electoral Board. These systems provide end to end security (i.e., from the voter to the Electoral Board) by cryptographic means without having to rely on the complex technological infrastructure and system administrators sitting between the voters and the Electoral Board. Since there are alternative implementations of End to End Cryptographic IDV systems that do not use receipts, we suggest to include in the Guidelines two types of End to End Cryptographic IDV systems: receipt-based systems and systems without receipts.