EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Stanley A. Klein
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
General Comments
Comment : | The VVSG is Seriously Inadequate for the Potential Threat The VVSG fails to take advantage of the technology developed over the past 30 years for properly protecting computer systems, including the Defense Department “Orange Book” and the Common Criteria (International Standards Organization standard ISO15408), for which NIST is a primary center of expertise. A threat model that could be used as a basis was provided in Section 5.1.2.3 of IEEE P1583 draft 5.3.2 that was provided to the TGDC. The text of that threat model is reproduced as Appendix B to these comments. The threat model clearly states that governmental power is the asset requiring protection in voting machine security and that those attempting to compromise election integrity are likely to be highly motivated, technically expert, and wellfinanced. The potential pool of threat agents is identified as including personnel of voting machine manufacturers and their suppliers, election administrators, political operatives, and polling place personnel. Based on allegations of malicious tampering in recent elections, the threat agent pool potentially attempting to influence elections by cybercriminal stealth should be expanded to include law enforcement officials, former operatives of US and foreign intelligence communities, and organized crime.