EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | Kathy Dopp
Organization : | National Election Data Archive
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | A1D
Page no. : | D-3
Line no.: | 3
Comment : | RE: Appendix D (your comment form does not permit Section: Appendix D or Section: D-1 to be entered) Cryptographic audit schemes merely verify that the individual voter voted, but not that all the votes were correctly counted. ALL voters could verify that their ballots had been recorded and still the votes could be incorrectly counted. They do not solve the problem of auditability. If the voters can actually see how their ballots were cast, then they lend themselves towards vote-buying, and even so, could be counted incorrectly even if all voters verified their ballots were cast correctly, unless all ballots were released to any independent organization who wanted to put a system on the Internet for voters to use to verify their ballots. Such cryptographic systems are not a logical solution to accurately counted elections.