EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | David B. Aragon
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
General Comments
Comment : | DRE Should Not Be Used As a Reference Point The VVSG errs in implicitly assuming that a voting machine is a ORE, treating other systems as variations or special cases. This is the same error made by IEEE P 15 83 and some others, but it is still an error. Even supposing that a single architecture were chosen as a reference point, DRE is unsuitable for that role. DRE shares an essential quality with Votomatic, namely, machine-readable output to facilitate automated counting. Votomatic was also regarded in its time as a great step forward, so much so as to justify discarding the voter's ability to review the voted ballot. That was a mistake, as we now know. Repeating that mistake cannot have been HAVA's intent. The often-cited advantages of touch screens are non sequitur as regards DRE, because touch screens are input devices. What makes a machine a ORE is its output. ORE output is electronic, and not accessible to any voter at all. That output, however, is the ballot.9 Thus, the entire premise of ORE is that voters ought not to examine their ballots. This is not only a technical blunder, it is a moral one. And it IS inherent in the DRE architecture. EAC is abundantly aware of the security problems inherent in a machine that does not allow its output to be checked against its input. Those who raise that alarm have the proper expertise, are correct, and should be heeded. However, EAC has a non-technical basis stronger than "trust the experts" for judging the DRE architecture, namely, that it is anti-democratic. It impedes public scrutiny. This is a very serious flaw, irrespective of whether or not there is actual fraud that would be detected by such scrutiny in any particular instance. Paper trail standards are at pains to patch up this flaw by adding features and devices. For example, §6.8.7.2.2 in the VVSG specifies a touch-proof enclosure, which is necessary for DRE but would be unnecessary with some systems and absurd with others.lo Besides the error of assuming ORE, this Winchester House approachl! unfortunately reinforces the view of transparency as a "feature" that some customers might choose not to purchase. EAC is chartered to create a uniform standard, precisely because of the past optional use of inadequately designed equipment in some jurisdictions.