EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Name : | David B. Aragon
Organization : | N/A
Post Date : | 9/30/2005
Section Comments
Section : | 5.1.3
Page no. : |
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Comment : | Section Comments: Telecommunications (Section 5) §5.1.3 (Data Transmissions) This section mentions "transmitting votes individually over a public network." The third bullet point reads: Vote Transmission: For systems that transmit votes individually over a public network, the transmission of a single vote within a network at a polling place and to the county (or contractor) for consolidation with other county vote data; It has traditionally been assumed - and there is no reason to assume otherwise now - that the communication of even partial vote totals, let alone individual votes, while the polls are still open is an invitation to malfeasance. Votes should not be transmitted to any facility where their time or order of arrival could be noted - not even to an election office, let alone to a contractor, let alone over a public network. At any given time of day, polling place registers identify who has voted. Partisan observers use that infonnation to make GOTV calls during the day. To correlate that information with the (time-ordered) individual vote records or with a running total is a temptingly easy job, and even before computers were available to increase the temptation, procedures were in place to prevent it by requiring that votes be aggregated. What is the basis for weakening that protection now? The first bullet point suggests a possible basis, a highly disturbing one: the VVSG apparently make an explicit provision for a ballot not to be secret. The first bullet under §5.1.3 reads: Voter Authentication: Coded information that confirms the identity ofa voter for security purposes for a system that transmits votes individually over a public network; The above clearly relates the "identity of a voter" to "votes [transmitted] individually". Such a relationship must not be present in any data transmitted over any medium at all. If the intent of the VVSG language is to allow for a new method of voting, but that method cannot provide a secret ballot, then VVSG must not support it. If not to tie a voter to a vote, then the only possible reason for transmitting votes individually is to allow a head start for the counting process. But this, too, is malfeasance. The candidates and parties are - and should be - pennitted to observe the count. If the count is underway while the polls are open, use will surely be made of the partial returns, and some voters will go to the polls armed with tactical information that those voting earlier in the day did not have.